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SHOULD THE DEMOCRATS MOVE TO THE LEFT ON
ECONOMIC POLICY?1
By Andrew Gelman and Cexun Jeffrey Cai
Columbia University
Could John Kerry have gained votes in the 2004 Presidential elec-
tion by more clearly distinguishing himself from George Bush on eco-
nomic policy? At first thought, the logic of political preferences would
suggest not: the Republicans are to the right of most Americans on
economic policy, and so in a one-dimensional space with party posi-
tions measured with no error, the optimal strategy for the Democrats
would be to stand infinitesimally to the left of the Republicans. The
median voter theorem suggests that each party should keep its policy
positions just barely distinguishable from the opposition.
In a multidimensional setting, however, or when voters vary in
their perceptions of the parties’ positions, a party can benefit from
putting some daylight between itself and the other party on an issue
where it has a public-opinion advantage (such as economic policy for
the Democrats). We set up a plausible theoretical model in which the
Democrats could achieve a net gain in votes by moving to the left
on economic policy, given the parties’ positions on a range of issue
dimensions. We then evaluate this model based on survey data on
voters’ perceptions of their own positions and those of the candidates
in 2004.
Under our model, it turns out to be optimal for the Democrats
to move slightly to the right but staying clearly to the left of the
Republicans’ current position on economic issues.
1. Introduction. In the 2004 presidential election campaign, it has been
suggested that voters saw little difference between the parties on economics
but large differences on other issues. The Democrats are traditionally closer
than the Republicans to the average voter’s view on the economy. Should the
Democrats have moved to the left on economic issues? Could such a strategy
win them votes? We study this using a theoretical model and survey data.
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Fig. 1. Some possibilities in a one-dimensional spatial model: the curve indicates the
opinions of voters on economic issues, and D and R show the positions of the Democratic
and Republican parties, respectively. In all three pictures the Republicans are right of cen-
ter. In (b), the Democrats are at the median voter; in (c), the Democrats are just barely
to the left of the Republicans, thus optimizing their vote share if the Republicans are not
free to move. (We are assuming here that the Republican position is fixed, perhaps because
they are the incumbent party or perhaps because of strong policy preferences.)
1.1. Candidate positions and the median voter theorem. In a two-party
system the median voter theorem states that it is in each party’s best in-
terest to move toward the center (the median) of the distribution of voters
[Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957)]. If either party is not at the median, the
other party has a winning strategy. For example, in Figure 1(a) the Repub-
licans have a position to the right of the average voter. If the Democrats sit
at the median [see Figure 1(b)], they will attract more than half the voters.
But the Democrats will do even better by moving just infinitesimally to the
left of the Republicans [see Figure 1(c)] and getting the votes of everyone to
the left.
This analysis ignores the possibility that the Republicans can also move
(an issue to which we return in Section 4). If both parties are free to move
to optimize their votes, they will converge to an equilibrium where they are
both at the median.
The median voter theorem is regularly falsified by actual data. Politi-
cians regularly depart from the median [Poole and Rosenthal (1997)] de-
spite there being clear evidence of an electoral benefit for having moderate
positions [Gelman and Katz (2005)]. Legislators’ distances from the median
have been found to be correlated with district characteristics [Gerber and
Lewis (2004)]. There are many practical reasons for politicians to move away
from the center. Ideological positioning is only one of the factors influencing
election outcomes, and a candidate might well, for example, sacrifice an esti-
mated 2% of the vote in order to be better positioned to implement desired
policies in the event of an election victory. There are also other constituen-
cies to satisfy (including campaign contributors, party activists and primary
election voters). We are assuming that ideological stances reflect real pol-
icy issues—or, to put it another way, we are assuming that the candidates
have already performed whatever ideological posturing they can, and that
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changes in their spatial “locations” can be effected only by changes in policy
positions.
The median voter theorem also becomes more complicated with con-
straints on candidate positions, multiple issue dimensions, and variation
among voters in perceptions of candidates. These are the directions we ex-
plore in this paper, to see whether the Democrats might gain from moving
to the left on economic issues, apparently contradicting the one-dimensional
picture in Figure 1.
2. Simple theoretical models. We shall illustrate the potential benefits
for the Democrats to move using a simple spatial voting model with error
[following Erikson and Romero (1990)] in one, two and three dimensions. In
each model we set up a simple unimodal distribution for voter preferences,
place the two parties in this distribution, and then consider what happens to
the Democrats’ share of the vote if we change their position on the economic
dimension.
2.1. Spatial voting models in 1, 2 and 3 dimensions.
One-dimensional model. We stipulate that voters’ individual positions
on the economy follow a unit normal distribution, with negative and positive
values being liberal and conservative. We further assume that the Repub-
licans’ position is +2 (very conservative) and that the Democrats start at
+1 (somewhat conservative). If we now let the Democrats move freely, it is
clear that their optimal position is around +1.9999, so that they will get
all the votes of the people to their left. [See Figure 1(c).] This is the sort
of reasoning that leads the Democrats to move as close as possible to the
Republicans while staying just slightly toward the center.
This model also predicts that the Democrats will get over 90% of the
vote! In actual elections, though, the Republicans actually do pretty well,
but maybe not specifically because of their conservative economic policies
on issues such as tax rates, trade, the minimum wage, and so forth.
Two-dimensional model. We now move to a two-dimensional model, whose
dimensions we label as “economic issues” and “all other issues.” Figure 2(a)
shows our assumptions: the voters have a bivariate normal distribution with
correlation 0.5 (fiscal conservatives are commonly, but not always, social
conservatives), the Republicans are at (+2,+1)—very conservative in eco-
nomic policy, somewhat conservative otherwise—and the Democrats are at
(+1,−2)—moderately conservative economically, very liberal otherwise. Fi-
nally, we assume the two dimensions are equally important and that a voter
will prefer the candidate who is closer (in Euclidean distance).
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Fig. 2. Some possibilities in a two-dimensional spatial model: the points in the scatter-
plot indicate the opinions of voters on economic and other issues, and D and R show
the positions of the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. In both pictures the
Republicans are right of center on economics and on other issues, and the Democrats are
left of center on other issues. In (a), the Democrats are at just barely to the left of the
Republicans on economics; in (b), the Democrats are at the median. Unlike in the one-di-
mensional scenario (see Figure 1), the Democrats are better off separating themselves from
the Republicans on economic issues.
In Figure 2(a) more voters are closer to the Republicans’ position than
to the Democrats’. Although the Democrats are slightly more moderate on
economic issues, they are further from the majority of the voters.
Now suppose the Democrats have the freedom to alter their position—but
only on the economic dimension (see Section 4 for discussion of this point).
Should they move leftward (toward the median voter) or rightward (toward
the Republicans, in the way that would be recommended from the one-
dimensional model)? The answer is: unlike in one dimension, the Democrats
should move to the left! Figure 2(b) shows that if the Democrats move to
(0,−2), they pick up votes from the Republicans.
More generally, Figure 3(a) (computed by simulation using 10,000 voters
randomly-sampled from the bivariate normal distribution) shows the propor-
tion of voters who would prefer the Republicans, under the spatial model, as
a function of the Democrats’ position. In this configuration the Democrats
benefit by being slightly more conservative than the average voter but still
clearly separated from the Republicans on the economic dimension, so as to
be closer to the mass of voters in the two-dimensional space.
This model seems unrealistic, as it predicts that the Republicans support
could vary from the range of 45% to 65%. We shall discuss more realistic
models below. The point here is that even the simple spatial model has
interesting implications when moving beyond one dimension, leading to a
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violation of the often-assumed rule that the Democrats would gain by being
as conservative as possible (and, conversely, that the Republicans should be
as liberal as possible).
Three-dimensional model. Figure 3(b) shows that a similar pattern holds
for the three-dimensional model. Here the dimensions are economic, for-
eign, and social policy. We assume the voters follow a normal distribution
with correlation 0.5 among each pair of dimensions, with Republicans at
(+2,+1,+1) and Democrats at (x,−1,−2), where we consider values of x
ranging from −2 to +2. If we consider x=+1 to be the status quo, we see
that, as in two dimensions, the Democrats would do better to move to the
left, toward the mass of the voters.
2.2. Varying the model specification. Our spatial model can be general-
ized in many ways, two of which we consider here. First, we suppose that
different voters have different perceptions about where candidates stand on
the issues. Second, we suppose that preferences depend on factors other than
ideology.
Differing perceptions of candidate issue stances. Different voters have
different views about where the candidates stand on the issues. This varia-
tion can be expressed as an error term in our model of candidate positions,
and the distribution of these perceptions can be estimated using survey data.
Fig. 3. (a) Proportion of voters who would prefer the Democrats, as a function of the
party ’s position on the economy, assuming that the Democrats’ positions on other issues
is fixed at −2 and that the Republicans’ positions are fixed at +2 on the economy and +1
on other issues; see Figure 2. Under these conditions, the Democrats are best off being
very slightly to the right of center. They should not be at +1.999 as would be implied by
the simple one-dimensional spatial theory. (b) Proportion of voters who would prefer the
Democrats, as a function of the party ’s position on the economy, in a similar three-dimen-
sional spatial model. As in two dimensions, it benefits the Democrats to clearly distinguish
themselves from the Republicans on the economy.
6 A. GELMAN AND C. J. CAI
What will be the effect of adding uncertainty about party positions? In
the one-dimensional model, it can make a big difference. Once we add un-
certainty, it is no longer optimal for the Democrats to be infinitesimally
to the left of the Republicans. Even in one dimension, it makes sense for
the Democrats to move to the left—that is, toward the center—to establish
a clear difference for the voters [Erikson and Romero (1990)]. In addition,
as discussed by Chappell and Keech (1986), in the presence of uncertainty
about party positions, it makes sense for parties to move toward their policy
preferences.
Even in the absence of motivation or turnout effects, once there is uncer-
tainty or variation in perceptions of candidates, a party can gain by clearly
delineating itself on issues for which it has popular support (such as the
economy for Democrats). Separation is beneficial in itself if it conveys the
relative positions of the parties to more of the voters. We shall explore this
further in our empirical analysis in the next section.
In two or more dimensions, adding uncertainty doesn’t change the fun-
damentals of the model: depending on the positions of the parties and the
distribution of the voters, it can still makes sense for the Democrats to
move toward the center, or to distance themselves from the Republicans on
economic issues.
Allowing preferences to depend on factors other than ideology. There
are also the “valence issues.” Suppose all the voters’ positions on issues
are fixed, and the candidate positions are fixed. Then the economy booms.
This will benefit the party in power, even if basic views on economy are
not changed. A change in the economy might also change voters’ views
about economic issues, but the “valence” idea is that, in addition to any
such fundamental change, there will be a shift in preferences. This would
be expressed as an additive term in the utility model. Thus, the relative
utility of the Democrats, compared to the Republicans, for voter i, would
be ‖xi − R‖
2 − ‖xi − D‖
2 + shift, where xi is the (multidimensional) ide-
ological position of voter i, R and D are the positions of the two parties,
and the shift represents valence issues. “Valence issues” in this definition
also include incumbency advantage, unequal spending, and any other ad-
vantages for one party or another, beyond issue positions. This framework
is consistent with the findings of Rosenstone (1984) and others that election
outcomes are predictable given measures of ideological difference and recent
economic conditions. As Groseclose (2001) points out, a candidate who is
weaker on valence issues can be motivated to move away from the center on
issues.
One can also alter the model in other ways. For example, so far we have
assumed a quadratic utility function—that is, based on squared Euclidean
distance between candidates and voters. Instead we can define utility based
SHOULD THE DEMOCRATS MOVE TO THE LEFT ON ECONOMIC POLICY? 7
Fig. 4. Respondents’ views of Bush, Kerry, and themselves on a scale of −9 (extremely
liberal) to +9 (extremely conservative) for economic policies and −8 (extremely liberal)
to +8 (extremely conservative) for social policies. Points have been jittered to avoid over-
plotting. The symbols in the third graph show the average perceived positions of Bush and
Kerry.
on absolute-value distance [i.e., changing from d(x, y) =
∑
j(xj − yj)
2 to
d(x, y) =
∑
j |xj − yj|, in both cases summing over dimensions j]. Changing
this distance function has little effect on the basic patterns we have found.
The utility function can also be generalized so that some issues are more
important than others—that is, a weighted sum over dimensions instead of
a simple sum.
3. Empirical data on voter and candidate positions on issues. The anal-
ysis presented in the preceding section is interesting, counterintuitive, and
potentially appealing if you think it would be desirable for the two parties
to be further apart, to present a clearer choice to voters. We test it using
voters’ placements of themselves and the candidates on economic and social
issues in the 2004 National Election Study.
We take three questions for each set of issues,2 using all the relevant
questions from the National Election Study in which respondents were asked
to judge the positions of Bush, Kerry, and themselves. We then summed the
responses in each dimension, yielding a −9 to 9 scale on economic issues
and a −8 to 8 scale on social issues. We then have six data points for each
respondent, representing economic and social positions as judged for Bush,
Kerry, and self. Figure 4 displays the data: there is correlation across issue
2The social issues were opinions about the role of women, gun-control policy, and
government aid to African Americans. The economic issues were opinions about the level of
spending that the government should undertake in the economy, the role of the government
in providing an economic environment where there is job security, and the level at which
the government should spend on defense. We replicated our analysis removing the defense
spending question (which is arguably on a different dimension than economics) and got
similar results [Cai (2006)].
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dimensions and also a lot of variation. It is perhaps surprising that voters
differed so much in their assessments of where Bush and Kerry stand on the
issues.
To estimate the effect of a change in party positions, we model in three
steps the data on issue attitudes and vote preference. First, we fit linear
regressions to predict views of Bush’s and Kerry’s policy positions, given re-
spondent’s party identification and self-placements on the issues. Second, we
fit logistic regressions to the probability of supporting Bush (among those re-
spondents who express a preference), given respondent’s party identification
and his or her relative distance from each candidate on the issues. Third, we
consider counterfactuals in which the candidates’ perceived issue positions
change (by altering the intercepts in the regression in the first stage of the
model), and then seeing the effect in aggregate vote preferences as predicted
by the logistic regressions.
Model of perceived candidate issue positions given self-placements. We fit
separate regressions on four different outcomes—views of Bush’s and Kerry’s
position on economic and social issues—and the display in Figure 5 shows
the estimated coefficients for the constant term and for self-perceptions on
economic and social issues. Within each of the twelve plots are the estimates
for the models fit separately to Democrats, independents and Republicans.
In considering Figure 5, we first discuss the two columns on the left,
which relate to views of the candidates’ economic positions. The constant
terms show, unsurprisingly, that Bush is viewed as more conservative than
Kerry, with Democrats perceiving Bush as more conservative and Repub-
licans perceiving Kerry as more liberal. The coefficients for self-perception
on economic issues show a striking pattern: the more liberal a Democrat
is on economic issues, the more he or she views Bush as conservative and
Kerry as liberal, with the reverse happening for Republicans. Apparently,
there is a strong motivation to believe that your party’s candidate is sim-
ilar to you in his political views. Weaker patterns appear in the first two
plots in the lowest row of Figure 5 with self-perceptions on social issues be-
ing slightly negatively predictive of views of Bush’s economic position and
slightly positively predictive of views on Kerry.
We now consider the two columns on the right of Figure 5. Again, the
intercepts are higher for Bush than for Kerry, but to a much weaker extent
than for the economic position, indicating that more of the variation in views
of the candidates’ positions on social issues is explained by respondents’
self-perceptions. Here the patterns are more complex. Democrats’ views of
Bush’s position on social issues is negatively predicted by self-perceptions
on economic issues, with self-perception on social issues not coming into the
equation at all. In contrast, Democrats’ views of Kerry’s positions on social
issues are entirely predicted by self-perceptions on social issues. Now we
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Fig. 5. Estimated coefficients for the regressions of perceptions of Bush and Kerry on
economic and social issues. The four columns of the display represent these four outcomes.
For each, the top, middle and bottom rows show estimates (±1 standard error) of the
constant term and the coefficients for self-perception on economic and social issues. The
model was fit separately to Democrats, independents and Republicans, as indicated by the
three points within each graph. Generally, Democrats with more liberal positions viewed
Kerry as more liberal and Bush as more conservative on the issues, and Republicans show
the opposite pattern.
look at the coefficients for Republican respondents: to predict their views of
Bush’s position on social issues, only their self-perception on social issues
is relevant, but when predicting Kerry’s position on social issues, only their
self-perception on economics is relevant.
To summarize, voters appear to characterize their own party’s nominee’s
positions in a way consistent with their self-perception on each issue di-
mension. But their views of the other party’s nominee, in both dimensions,
is predicted (with a negative coefficient) solely based on self-perception on
economics.
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Model of vote choice given distances from candidates. Our next step is a
logistic regression model predicting vote preference given ideological distance
from candidates. We define, for each survey respondent i, the distance from
Bush minus the distance from Kerry:
(dist.E)i = (econ
Bush
i − econ
self
i )
2 − (econKerryi − econ
self
i )
2,
(dist.S)i = (soc
Bush
i − soc
self
i )
2 − (socKerryi − soc
self
i )
2,
and then we fit a logistic regression of vote intention (yi = 1 if respondent i
supports Bush for President, 0 for Kerry, excluding undecideds and others
from the analysis) on dist.E and dist.S. We fit separate models for each
party identification, yielding
Pr(yi = 1) = logit
−1(−1.32− 0.05 · (dist.E)i − 0.04 · (dist.S)i)
for Democrats,
Pr(yi = 1) = logit
−1(0.38− 0.05 · (dist.E)i + 0.02 · (dist.S)i)
(3.1)
for independents,
Pr(yi = 1) = logit
−1(2.30− 0.03 · (dist.E)i − 0.02 · (dist.S)i)
for Republicans.
As expected, dist.E (economics) is more important than dist.S (social is-
sues), and the coefficients themselves are negative: if you are further from
Bush than from Kerry, you are less likely to support Bush. The only ex-
ception is the positive coefficient for dist.S among independents, but this
is not statistically significant (the estimate is 0.02 with a standard error of
0.02) so we take it to just represent sampling error. We also see that the
coefficients for ideological distance are greater for Democrats than for Re-
publicans, which is consistent with the idea that Democrats are more diverse
in their political preferences (so that conservative Democrats are more likely
to vote for Bush than liberal Republicans were to vote for Kerry).
Model of aggregate vote given shifts in candidates’ positions. Our next
step is to consider hypothetical changes in the candidates’ positions on eco-
nomic and social issues, and see how these would translate into vote changes.
For each change, we simply alter the constant term in the appropriate regres-
sions shown in Figure 5—for example, if we want to shift Kerry by one point
to the right on the −9 to 9 economic scale, we add 1 to the intercepts of the
“Kerry econ” regressions for each of the three party identification groups.
We then run the models of the previous sections forward, first simulating
random positions from the linear models from Figure 5 (with intercepts al-
tered appropriately), then computing estimated ideological distances and
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Fig. 6. Predicted change in Bush’s share of the vote, if Kerry ’s or Bush’s position on
economic or social issues were to shift by a specified amount. The predictions are calculated
based on the fitted logistic model of vote choice given voters’ ideological distances from
candidates. Positions on the economy and on social issues are measured on a −9 to 9 scale,
and a −8 to 8 scale, respectively; see Figure 4. Based on this model, it would be beneficial
for Kerry to shift slightly to the right in both dimensions, for Bush to shift slightly to the
left on social issues, and for Bush to shift a great deal to the left on economic issues. The
curves are slightly jittery because of simulation variability.
simulating vote preferences from the logistic regressions (3.1). This repre-
sents a replicated election outcome under the hypothetical position shift.
For each hypothesized shift, we take the average of 100 simulations to get
the predicted election outcome.
Figure 6 shows the effect, under this model, of shifting the positions of
either Kerry or Bush on economic or social issues, by as much as 3 points in
either direction. The answer to the question posed by the title of the paper
appears to be No, Kerry should not have moved to the left on economic
policy. Conventional wisdom appears to be correct: Kerry would have ben-
efited by moving to the right, and Bush by moving to the left. The optimal
shifts for Bush are greater than those for Kerry, which is consistent with the
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Fig. 7. Predicted change in Bush’s share of the vote, if Kerry ’s or Bush’s position were
to shift on both economic and social issues. According to this model, the optimal strategy
for Kerry is to move 1 point to the right in both dimensions; in contrast, Bush would
benefit by moving about 2 points to the left on social issues and nearly 3 points to the left
on the economy.
observation that voters are, on average, closer to the Democrats on issue
attitudes.
Figure 7 shows similar calculations, allowing each candidate to move in
both issue dimensions. Again, this model finds Kerry benefiting by moving
a bit to the right, and Bush benefiting by moving a lot to the left, especially
in the economic dimension. One could continue along these lines by allowing
the two candidates to move simultaneously, but this is not our goal here.
We do not consider our calculations to represent a realistic causal model
of what would happen if candidates were to move; rather, it is a way of
exploring the multidimensional space of voters’ perceptions of themselves
and the candidates, and evaluating in a fairly direct way the hypotheses of
Section 2.
Comparing these shifts to the candidates’ average perceived positions (see
the rightmost plot in Figure 4), the optimal position for Kerry is to the right
of his position at the time, but still far to the left of the perceived position
of Bush. Given that the Republicans are far to the right of the median voter
on economic issues—and given the large variation in voters’ perceptions of
the candidates’ positions—it appears to be best for the Democrats to stay in
the center, quite a bit left of the Republicans, in order to make their relative
location clear to the voters.
Comparison to the theoretical model. The empirical model we have used
is a generalization of the formal model of Section 2, in four ways: (a) vot-
ers are allowed to vary in their perceived positions of the candidates, (b)
candidates can differ in their valences, (c) the two issue dimensions need
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not be equal in importance, and (d) different models apply to Democrats,
Republicans and independents. The model (3.1) is equivalent to a spatial
voting model with weighted squared Euclidean distance and logistic errors
(the discrete responses have enough different categories that the continuous
approximation seems reasonable enough).
The empirical conclusions are similar but not identical to the results of
Section 2, with the key difference being that the voters on average perceived
Kerry as slightly left of center on economic issues [see Figure 4(c)], as com-
pared to the theoretical model of Figure 2(a), which hypothesized that voters
saw little difference between the candidates on this dimension. In both the
theoretical and empirical models, the Democrats would benefit by placing
or maintaining some distance between themselves and the Republicans on
economic issues.
4. Practical concerns.
4.1. Using survey responses to measure perceived ideological positions.
A key issue regarding with the empirical part of this study is the reliability
and validity of the survey questions about candidate- and self-placement. It
has long been known that responses to individual issue positions are unsta-
ble over time and are not meaningful for many voters [Erikson and Tedin
(2004)]. In our data this can be seen in the wide variation in perceptions
of Bush and Kerry on the issues (see the left two plots in Figure 4). An-
solabehere, Rodden and Snyder (2006) have shown that more can be learned
by averaging the responses to several related questions. Our economic and
social attitude scales are based on only three questions each (in the National
Election Study, all we could find that asked about the candidates and the
respondent), and we would be interested in results from a more detailed
survey. On the other hand, if the goal is to model what would happen if
candidate positions change, this needs to be filtered through the imperfect
perceptions of voters, so it is not a fatal flaw that respondents are not com-
pletely consistent with themselves and each other.
Another concern is the complicated nonsequential relationship between
party identification, issue attitudes, perceptions of candidates, and vote
preference [Page and Jones (1979)]. Party identification is a stable indi-
vidual measure [Miller and Shanks (1996)], so we do not mind subdividing
our analysis into Democrats, independents and Republicans. Beyond this,
we recognize that it is an approximation to model vote preference as a
function of candidate perceptions rather than the reverse. Our regressions
are based on the observed correlations between the issue-response and vote-
choice questions, and we are implicitly making additional causal assumptions
in using the model to speculate on what would happen if the candidate po-
sitions changed. We think our approach is a useful starting point, however,
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and even this imperfect empirical analysis gives insight into models such as
the median voter theorem that are commonly applied automatically without
any connection to data.
4.2. Constraints and flexibility in party positions. Our analysis treats
the two parties asymmetrically and treats the issue dimensions differently
as well. Is it reasonable to suppose that the Republicans cannot move ideo-
logically but the Democrats can? And is it plausible that the Democrats are
free to move to the left on economic policy but cannot move to the center
on foreign policy and social issues?
We would answer Yes to both these questions. It is reasonable to sup-
pose that, as the party in power, the Republicans are less inclined to make
an ideological move that would convince the voters. In addition, their con-
servative position on economic issues is important to a key segment of the
Republicans’ electoral, financial, and intellectual base. It makes sense that
the Republicans will remain to the right of the majority of voters on eco-
nomic issues, even if this costs them some votes.
As for the Democrats, we would expect that most of their stakeholders
would prefer a move to the left on economic issues—if anything, it might
be that their moderately conservative position was chosen partly from a
median-voter thinking as exemplified by Figure 1.3 In contrast, internal
party pressures could make it more difficult for the Democrats to move
toward the center in other dimensions.
A related question is how the parties can signal their position changes to
the voters. Our models simply assume the ability to do so, but presumably
the voters would need some convincing that a move to the center is not just
a pre-election ploy.
Finally, a common counter-argument to spatial voting models is that mov-
ing to the median might gain votes at the middle at the expense of the other
party, but at the cost of diminishing turnout among one’s core supporters.
There is no particular evidence that this happened in 2004. The innova-
tion of the theoretical model of this paper is to posit a counterintuitive
motivation for a party (in this case, the Democrats) to distinguish itself in
policy from the other part, purely from spatial voting concerns arising from
multidimensionality and variation in voters’ perceptions of the candidates,
without bringing in turnout.
Acknowledgments. We thank Jasjeet Sekhon, Shigeo Hirano, Robert Erik-
son, Jeff Lax, Joseph Bafumi and David Park for helpful conversations.
3Moving to the left would not be costless for the Democrats, however. In particular, one
would expect them to lose some contributions from businesses and affluent individuals, and
support of policies such as tariff barriers could be unpopular among elite opinion-makers
such as those who determine newspaper endorsements.
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CORRECTION: SHOULD THE DEMOCRATS MOVE TO THE
LEFT ON ECONOMIC POLICY?
By Andrew Gelman
Columbia University
In the paper “Should the Democrats move to the left on economic policy?”
[Ann. Appl. Stat. 2 (2008) 536–549] by Andrew Gelman and Cexun Jeffrey
Cai, because of a data coding error on one of the variables, all our analysis
of social issues is incorrect. Thus, arguably, all of Section 3 is wrong until
proven otherwise.
We thank Yang Yang Hu for discovering this error and demonstrating its
importance.
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